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Abstract
A major obstacle for introducing carbon pricing are its distribu-
tional implications: climate policy is believed to be regressive. We il-
luminate the role of carbon-intensive subsistence consumption for the
prospect of making carbon pricing progressive. The distributional im-
pacts of a carbon tax reform depend on the revenue recycling options:
we prove that lump-sum transfers proportional to income and linear
income tax cuts make the reform regressive and that this is due only to
subsistence consumption. By contrast, returning the revenue as uni-
form lump-sum transfers renders the carbon tax reform progressive.
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1 Introduction
Mitigating climate change requires substantial reductions in carbon emis-
sions, which would best be achieved by carbon pricing. An important ob-
stacle to introducing carbon pricing are distributional concerns: Pricing
emissions in developed countries is often believed to harm the poorest part
of the population due to the higher share of their income that is spent on
carbon-intensive goods.
Grainger and Kolstad (2010) show for the case of the U.S., that for most
carbon-intensive goods such as electricity, heating and food, subsistence
levels exist and that a price increase in these goods is the main driver behind
the regressivity of carbon taxes. This mechanism, to our knowledge, has not
received enough attention in the literature on the distributional implications
of carbon pricing.
Analyzing the distributional effects of a carbon tax reform while ac-
counting for a subsistence level of carbon-intensive goods is the purpose
of the present note. We use a stylized analytical model that features two
consumption goods, one of which is assumed to be carbon-intensive.1 House-
holds differ only in their productivity and must consume a minimal amount
of the carbon-intensive good to survive, which is modeled by means of a
Stone-Geary utility function. In this note we are only concerned with the
short-term distributional effects of a carbon tax reform, i.e. how setting
a price on carbon impacts inequality2, which we believe to be decisive for
political decision-making.
We find three main results. First, when the tax revenue is returned to the
households via linear income tax cuts, or proportional to their productivity,
the overall effect of the tax reform is regressive. Second, for the case of uni-
form lump-sum recycling, the overall effect of the tax reform is progressive.
Finally we show that when setting the subsistence level of carbon-intensive
consumption to zero, regressive policies appear distribution-neutral.
Previous literature either relies on large numerical models (Rausch et al.,
2010, 2011) or on rather specific modeling assumptions (Chiroleu-Assouline
and Fodha, 2011, 2014; Fullerton and Monti, 2013). In fact, there seems to
be some disagreement in the theoretical literature on the extent to which
the regressivity of a carbon tax can be reduced by the recycling of its rev-
enues: Fullerton and Monti (2013) show, that in a model with household
heterogeneity in skills, “returning all of the revenue to low-skilled workers
is still not enough to offset higher product prices.” On the other hand,
Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha (2011, 2014) show in a model with a more
1For a more detailed numerical treatment that accounts for both the household and
the firm side in an optimal taxation framework see Klenert et al. (2015).
2This permits us to abstract from major factors usually discussed in the context of
climate policy, such as environmental damages, structural change and international coop-
eration.
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complex household heterogeneity structure, but less detail in pollution, that
“whatever the degree of regressivity of the environmental tax alone, it is
possible to design a recycling mechanism that renders the tax reform more
Pareto efficient, by simultaneously decreasing the wage tax and increasing
its progressivity.”3 Both studies mention a subsistence level of polluting
consumption as at least partially responsible for the regressivity of a carbon
tax, but refrain from modeling it.
Our results instead rely on this empirically verified mechanism of the
interaction between carbon taxation and inequality. Our findings are very
robust, since the only driver of our results is the assumption of a subsistence
level of carbon-intensive consumption.
This assumption is supported by a large body of literature that agrees
that lower income households spend a larger percentage of their income on
carbon-intensive goods, notably heating, electricity and food, than higher
income households: While Grainger and Kolstad (2010) demonstrate this for
the case of the U.S., Flues and Thomas (2015) confirm that taxes on heating
fuels and electricity are regressive over a set of 21 OECD countries. Wier
et al. (2001) study the case of Denmark and also comprehensively survey
studies of other countries. This spending behavior is often mentioned as
one of the main reasons for climate policy being regressive4 (Grainger and
Kolstad, 2010; Fullerton, 2011; Combet et al., 2010), but has received little
attention so far in the theoretical literature.
2 The model
We use a two sector model in which N households are distinguished by
their productivity. Households are required to consume a minimum amount
of the polluting good, which we model by means of a Stone-Geary utility
function. Since we only look at the near term, in which structural change
in the energy system is negligible, we use a static model. Furthermore we
assume that the prices of clean and polluting goods are fixed.
Households: There are N households in the economy which are distin-
guished only by their productivity φi. Each household is endowed with the
production factor T. A share li of the production factor is used at home and
can be interpreted as leisure, for the remaining share (T − li) the household
receives a rental rate r, so the households’ incomes are given by
Ii = φir(T − li)(1− τ0w + τw), (1)
3The numerical analyses by Rausch et al. (2010, 2011) yield an even stronger result:
under certain conditions the carbon tax itself has a progressive effect. The progressive
effects on the sources side (changes in factor prices) offset the regressive effects on the uses
side (higher product prices). In the present small analytical model, we only consider the
distributional impacts on the uses side.
4This might not be the case for developing countries, see Sterner (2011).
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where τ0w denotes the income tax before the carbon tax reform and τw is
a potential (linear) income tax reduction financed by carbon tax revenues.
We normalize the households’ productivities such that
∑N
i=1 φi = 1.
Households derive utility from the consumption of clean goods Ci, pollut-
ing goods Di and leisure li. They have the same non-homothetic preferences
and maximize the following utility function
U(Ci, Di, li) = C
α
i (Di −D0)βlγi , (2)
with α, β and γ > 0. Households are assumed to need a minimal level
D0 of polluting consumption. The utility function is not defined for Di <
D0, ∀i = 1 . . . N . The budget equation for each household is given by
Ci · pC +Di · pD · (1 + τ) = Ii + Li, (3)
with τ denoting a tax on the consumption of polluting goods and Li a lump-
sum transfer. We assume the prices of the commodities to be constant.
Maximizing the utility function (2) with respect to the budget equation
(3), yields the first order conditions of the households. Those can be re-
formed to obtain explicit expressions for each household’s consumption of
each commodity (the derivations can be found in Appendix A):
Ci =
α
(α+ β + γ)
1
pC
(
φirT (1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
, (4)
Di =
β
(α+ β + γ)
1
pD(1 + τ)
(
φirT (1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
+D0,
(5)
li =
γ
(α+ β + γ)
1
φir(1− τ0w + τw)
(
φirT (1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ)
)
.
(6)
Despite a substitution elasticity of one in the utility function, leisure
is not fixed (as in the Cobb-Douglas case) but influenced by the level of
subsistence consumption, taxes and transfers.
The model is only well-defined when all households are able to pay at
least for their minimum consumption D0, so
Ii + Li ≥ D0pD(1 + τ) for all i. (7)
Government: The government has a fixed spending requirement G,
which is financed by the (pre-existing) income tax τ0w. Additional revenue
can either be returned to the households via lump-sum transfers Li or re-
ductions in the income tax τw. The government’s budget constraint thus
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reads as:5
G+
N∑
i=1
Li +
N∑
i=1
φir(T − li)τw = τ ·D · pD +
N∑
i=1
φir(T − li)τ0w. (8)
3 Results
We analyze the distributional implications of three possible carbon tax re-
forms: First, the carbon tax revenues are returned to the households’ via
lump-sum transfers proportional to their productivity. Second, linear in-
come tax reductions are used as a means of revenue recycling. Third, each
household receives the same uniform lump-sum transfer.
Section 3.1 contains the main analytical results: We show in Proposition
1, that in the first and second scenario inequality is increased. In the third
scenario inequality is reduced (Proposition 2). Finally we demonstrate in
Proposition 3 that recycling the revenues as in the first and second scenario
is neutral, when the subsistence level of polluting consumption equals zero.
In Section 3.1 we consider the utility ratios of two of the households as
a measure of the distributional impacts of the carbon tax reform. For a
more refined inequality measure see Section 3.2, in which we demonstrate
numerically that (for the parameters given in Appendix B) the analytical
results derived in Propositions 1 and 2 also hold when the Gini coefficient
in utility is used as a measure of inequality.
3.1 Analytical results
The ratio Ui/Uj is derived by inserting the expressions (4)–(6) into the
households’ utility function (2) and then dividing the utility of household i
by the utility of household j:
Ui
Uj
=
Cαi (Di −D0)βlγi
Cαj (Dj −D0)βlγj
=
(
φj
φi
)γ ( (φirT (1− τ0w + τw) + Li −D0pD(1 + τ))
(φjrT (1− τ0w + τw) + Lj −D0pD(1 + τ))
)(α+β+γ) (9)
We choose the following notation: (Ui/Uj)
BT is the ratio of utilities
before taxes, (Ui/Uj)
AT-U is the ratio of utilities after taxes with uniform
lump-sum recycling of the revenues, (Ui/Uj)
AT-P is the case of a tax with
the revenues recycled proportional to each household’s productivity φi and
(Ui/Uj)
AT-DD is the case of a tax with the revenues recycled via linear income
tax reductions:
5The government is only represented through this budget constraint, it hence does not
optimize.
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(
Ui
Uj
)BT
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φirT (1− τ0w)−D0pD
φjrT (1− τ0w)−D0pD
)(α+β+γ)
, (10)
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-U
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φirT (1− τ0w) + τDpD 1N −D0pD(1 + τ)
φjrT (1− τ0w) + τDpD 1N −D0pD(1 + τ)
)(α+β+γ)
,
(11)
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-P
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φi(rT (1− τ0w) + τpDD)−D0pD(1 + τ)
φj(rT (1− τ0w) + τpDD)−D0pD(1 + τ)
)(α+β+γ)
,
(12)
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-DD
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φirT (1− τ0w + τw)−D0pD(1 + τ)
φjrT (1− τ0w + τw)−D0pD(1 + τ)
)(α+β+γ)
.
(13)
Proposition 1. The incidence of a tax on the polluting good is regressive,
if
(a) the revenues are recycled proportional to each household’s productivity
φi (i.e. Li = φiτpDD and τw = 0).
(b) the revenues are recycled via linear income tax cuts τw (i.e. τwr
∑N
i=1 φi(T−
li) = τpDD and Li = 0).
6
Proof. For the proof of part (a), it suffices to demonstrate that (Ui/Uj)
AT-P <
(Ui/Uj)
BT for φj > φi.
By introducing the auxiliary variables A and B we further simplify Equa-
tion (12) to(
Ui
Uj
)AT-P
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φi(A+B)−D0pD(1 + τ)
φj(A+B)−D0pD(1 + τ)
)(α+β+γ)
, (14)
with A = rT (1− τ0w) and B = τpDD. We can ignore the prefactor (φj/φi)γ
and the exponent (α + β + γ) for the moment since they cancel out when
6This result can be seen as related to the so called double dividend debate (Goulder,
1995; Bovenberg, 1999). In the traditional double dividend literature it is argued that
using carbon tax revenues for rebates in a pre-existing income tax system does not only
reduce pollution but also enhances efficiency. Proposition 1 (b) would thus imply that
reaping a possible double dividend via linear income tax cuts might come at the cost of
increased inequality.
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two utility ratios are compared. We furthermore reform the term φk(A+B),
with k in [i, j], such that it is of the form φkA(1 +B/A):(
φiA(1 +
B
A )−D0pD(1 + τ)
φjA(1 +
B
A )−D0pD(1 + τ)
)
. (15)
In both the numerator and the denominator of this expression a positive
and a negative term remain. The positive term can be increased by in-
creasing B/A, which has an increasing effect on the utility ratio (and thus
a decreasing effect on inequality). Similarly, the negative term (−D0pD)
can be increased by increasing τ , which decreases the utility ratio (and thus
increases inequality). We can infer from this expression directly that the
distributional effect of a carbon tax reform is neutral if B/A = τ , since
in that case the term (1 + τ) would cancel out and we would get that
(Ui/Uj)
AT-P = (Ui/Uj)
BT. The distributional effect of a tax reform is re-
gressive (progressive), if B/A < τ (B/A > τ). It thus remains to show that
B/A < τ . By inserting the expressions for A and B we get
B
A
=
τpDD
rT (1− τ0w)
< τ. (16)
By reforming this inequality we get:
pDD︸︷︷︸
total spending on polluting goods (before tax reform)
< rT (1− τ0w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total income w/o leisure term (before tax reform)
.
(17)
Since by assumption φi is strictly smaller than φj , households with j > 1
always consume a positive amount of leisure and of the clean good. Total
spending on polluting goods hence must be lower than total income (when
no leisure is consumed) and the inequality above always holds. This implies
that (Ui/Uj)
AT-P < (Ui/Uj)
BT, which closes the proof of part (a).
The proof of part (b) is analogous to that of part (a) with B = rTτw.
What remains to show is that B/A is smaller than τ . By inserting the
expressions for A and B we get:
B
A
=
τw
(1− τ0w)
< τ. (18)
For revenue recycling through income tax cuts the sum of all income tax
rebates equals the total carbon revenue: τwr
∑N
i=1 φi(T − li) = τpDD. We
use this relationship to eliminate τw from Equation (18) and get:
B
A
=
τpDD
(1− τ0w)r
∑N
i=1 φi(T − li)
< τ. (19)
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By reforming this expression we get:
pDD︸︷︷︸
total spending on polluting goods (before tax reform)
< (1− τ0w)r
N∑
i=1
φi(T − li)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total income (before tax reform)
.
(20)
For the same reason as in the proof of part (a) this inequality holds.
Proposition 2. The tax reform becomes progressive for uniform lump-sum
redistribution of the revenues (that is Li = L = τpDD/N for i = 1, . . . , N
and τw = 0).
Proof. A carbon tax reform with uniform lump-sum recycling of the rev-
enues simply adds the constant terms −D0pDτ < 0 (decreased utility due
to the tax on subsistence consumption) and τpDD/N > 0 (increased utility
due to the revenue recycling) to the numerator and the denominator of the
expression on the right side of Equation (10). Summing up these two terms
yields:
τpDD/N −D0pDτ = pDτ(D/N −D0) > 0, (21)
This expression is strictly bigger than zero since we assume that τ , pD > 0
and φi < φj . Therefore all agents with j > 1 have a level of polluting
consumption that is higher than the subsistence level D0, so the average level
of polluting consumption, D/N , is always higher than the subsistence level
D0. It remains to show that adding a positive constant to the numerator
and the denominator of a fraction that is smaller than one, increases this
fraction. For that purpose we use the following elementary inequality:
m < s⇒ m
s
<
m+ t
s+ t
, for t > 0 and m, s > 0.
Let m = φirT (1−τ0w)−D0pD, s = φjrT (1−τ0w)−D0pD and t = −D0pDτ +
τDpD/N. For i < j, φi < φj and thus m < s. From Equation (21) follows
that t > 0 and we also know that m, s > 0. It then follows directly that
(Ui/Uj)
BT = (Ui/Uj)
AT-U, which means that the tax reform is progressive.
Proposition 3. For a subsistence level of polluting consumption of zero
(D0 = 0), the revenue recycling mechanisms examined in Proposition 1, are
distribution-neutral, i.e. Proposition 1, does not hold anymore.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that it is only our assumption of a subsis-
tence level of polluting consumption that drives the results of Proposition
1. The result presented in Proposition 2, that uniform lump-sum recycling
reduces inequality, is independent of the level of D0.
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Proof. By setting D0 = 0 in Equations (10) and (12) we obtain(
Ui
Uj
)BT
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φirT (1− τ0w)
φjrT (1− τ0w)
)(α+β+γ)
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φi
φj
)(α+β+γ)
=
(
φj
φi
)γ (φi(rT (1− τ0w) + τpDD)
φj(rT (1− τ0w) + τpDD)
)(α+β+γ)
=
(
Ui
Uj
)AT-P
.
The same reasoning applies to the result derived in Proposition 1 b.
3.2 Verifying the results for the Gini coefficient
It is well known that the utility ratio, used for analytical convenience in the
previous subsection, is not an optimal measure of regressivity, as discussed
in Ray (1997), for instance. In this subsection we subject our propositions
about the distributional effects of carbon tax reform options to a robustness
check: the above model is solved numerically to calculate the Gini coefficient
in utility. We verify that (Ui/Uj) is a meaningful indicator of inequality, at
least for the parameters given in Appendix B. We consider the same revenue
recycling options as in as in Propositions 1 and 2.
Figure 1: The change in the Gini coefficient (in utility) for different carbon
revenue recycling mechanisms. For obtaining a numerical solution we use
the algebraic modeling software GAMS (Rosenthal, 2014). The parameters
used for creating Figure 1 are given in Appendix B.
We find that Propositions 1 and 2 remain valid when the Gini coefficient
in utility is used as an indicator of inequality (for the parameters given in
Appendix B), as can be seen in Figure 1.
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4 Conclusion
In this note we demonstrate conceptually that carbon-intensive subsistence
consumption is key to understand the distributional effects of a carbon tax
reform. Our analysis confirms that the existence of a subsistence level of
polluting consumption is a strong driver of the regressivity of carbon tax-
ation. This holds for both, the case that revenues are recycled lump-sum,
proportional to the households’ productivities, and for the case of recycling
via linear income tax cuts. By contrast, we prove that the overall effect of a
carbon tax reform can be made progressive by recycling the revenues as uni-
form lump-sum transfers. No additional assumptions are required to obtain
our analytical results, which makes the mechanisms at work transparent and
our modeling strategy very robust.
An example of a carbon tax combined with lump-sum rebates can be
found in Switzerland. Here carbon tax revenues are (at least partially)
recycled in a uniform lump-sum fashion, in the form of a reduction in health
insurance contributions (see for example Federal Office for the Environment
2015).
At least two interesting extensions of our framework are possible, but go
beyond the scope of this article: First, considering not only linear but also
non-linear income tax reductions and taxing emissions instead of output,
preferably in a general equilibrium setting that accounts for price effects on
the sources (firm) side. We treat this case in a further study with a numerical
model (see Klenert et al. 2015). Second, studying the dynamics of different
revenue recycling mechanisms when technological change is endogenous and
a decarbonization of the economy is possible.
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Appendices
A Derivation of the equations for Ci and Di
By maximizing Equation 2 subject to budget constraint 3 we obtain the two
First Order Conditions:
αC(α−1)(Di −D0)βlγi = λipC , (A.1)
βCα(Di −D0)(β−1)lγi = λipD(1 + τ), (A.2)
γCα(Di −D0)βlγ−1i = φir(1− τ0w + τw). (A.3)
By eliminating λi we get:
(Di −D0)
Ci
=
β
α
pC
pD(1 + τ)
, (A.4)
li
Ci
=
γ
α
pC
φir(1− τ0w + τw)
. (A.5)
Together with Equation 3, explicit expressions for Ci and Di can obtained
(see Equations (4), (5) and (6)).
B Parameters for calculating the Gini coefficient
For the numerical simulations we set N = 5. The individual productivities
are calibrated as in Table 1. The remaining parameters are given in Table
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Productivity (φi) 0.032 0.084 0.143 0.23 0.511
Table 1: Household productivities are calibrated to match data from the
U.S. Census Bureau on the income shares of different quintiles (DeNavas-
Walt et al., 2012).
2.
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α clean consumption share in utility 0.5
β polluting cons. share in utility 0.28
γ leisure share in utility 0.15
D0 subsistence level poll. consumption 0.15
pC , pD price of clean/polluting consumption 1
G government consumption 2.551
τ0w pre-existing income tax 30 %
Table 2: Calibration of the model parameters
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